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Abstract:  A  range  of  theories  have  attempted  to  explain  the 
existing variation in the level of civilian victimization across 
countries. To date, most of these theories have been focused on 
the  influence  of  the  strategic  environment  in  which  these 
atrocities  take  place  or  they  have  emphasized  the 
organizational  difference  between  the  involved  actors.  Less 
attention is, however, devoted to the possible spillover effect of 
these atrocities. This study fills this niche by analyzing the role 
of refugee flows on the diffusion of atrocities. We do so through 
statistical analyses of refugee from neighboring countries and 
the occurrence of atrocities in Africa during the period of 1995-
2010,  controlling  for  other  possible  explanation  of  atrocities. 
Our  study  is  the  first  to  systematically  examine  the  effect  of 
refugees  on  the  likelihood  of  atrocities  in  refugee-recipient 
states.  We  do  this  by  employing  a  spatial  lag  model  with  a 
temporal  component  with  two  different  spatial  weighting 
matrices. The preliminary results of the analyses suggest that 
refugees  indeed  influence  the  amount  of  atrocities  and  that 
atrocities  are  spatially  determined.  Furthermore,  civilian 
killings  is  primarily  caused  by  strategic  factors  such  as  the 
number of atrocities and rebel groups in neighboring state and 
the  number  of  rebel  groups  and  battle  deaths  in  the  host 
country.  2 
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A range of theories have attempted to explain the existing variation in the level of civilian victimization 
across countries. To date, most of these theories have been focused on the influence of the strategic 
environment in which these atrocities take place or they have emphasized the organizational difference 
between the involved actors. Less attention is, however, devoted to the possible spillover effect of these 
atrocities. This study fills this niche by analyzing the role of refugee flows on the diffusion of atrocities. 
We  do  so  through  statistical  analyses  of  refugee  from  neighboring  countries  and  the  occurrence  of 
atrocities in Africa during the period of 1995-2010, controlling for other possible explanation of 
atrocities. Our study is the first to systematically examine the effect of refugees on the likelihood of 
atrocities in refugee-recipient states. We do this by employing a spatial lag model with a temporal 
component with two different spatial weighting matrices. The preliminary results of the analyses suggest 
that refugees indeed influence the amount of atrocities and that atrocities are spatially determined. 
Furthermore, civilian killings is primarily caused by strategic factors such as the number of atrocities 
and rebel groups in neighboring state and the number of rebel groups and battle deaths in the host 
country.  
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Introduction 
Whereas relations between states have always been the central  topic in the field of 
international relations and in the study of conflict and the occurrence of violence, much 
academic  research  on  the  occurrence  of  atrocities  has  treated  this  phenomenon 
primarily as an „internal‟ issue, assuming that the causes of atrocities and violence is 
primarily due to domestic factors. For example, Hultman (2007) examines whether the 
deliberate perpetrated violence against civilians is related to the performance of rebels 
on  the  domestic  battlefield.  Also  Valentino,  Huth,  and  Balch-Lindsay  (2004)  have 
focused primarily on domestic level variables such as regime type as a key explanatory 
factor,  arguing  that  democratic  norms  are  the  key  restraint  against  the  killing  of 
civilians.  
  The implicit assumption of these studies is that violence against civilians is mostly 
driven by processes occurring within the state‟s territorial boundaries. Although we do 
not deny the influence of these domestic processes, we are of the opinion that the field 
is  flawed  by  a  too  narrow  vision  of  what  constitutes  the  occurrence  of  atrocities: 
individual states are treated as isolated units, unaffected by atrocities and actors in other 
states (Gleditsch 2009, 595). One important factor that is overlooked due to this „closed 
polity‟ view is the possible effect that refugees can have on the spread of atrocities 
across borders. Refugees can transport weapons, spread violent ideologies, change the 
power balance between ethnicities, and inspire other people to rebel. Consequently, it is 
hypothesized  that  they  can  increase  (pre-existing)  tensions  and  the  likelihood  of 
atrocities in the host country. Refugees are in this respect then also not only considered 
as a terrible consequence of violence, but rather as a possible cause for the spread of it. 
Of course, we realize that the vast majority of refugees never directly engage in political 
violence.  However,  although  we  might  not  like  the  idea,  we  should  regard  the 
possibility that refugees might be the catalyst of human right abuses across territorial 
boundaries.  
  Although not specifically focused on the occurrence of atrocities, many researchers 
have presented evidence that seems to indicate  that the  presence of refugees from 
neighboring countries leads to an increased probability of conflict diffusion (e.g. Brown 
1996; Gleditsch 2007; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). Even if we would assume that 
conflict  goes  hand  in  hand  with  the  occurrence  of  atrocities  against  the  civilian 4 
 
population, current investigations of the linkage between conflict diffusion and refugees 
suffer from some important methodological problems. Some studies have ignored the 
spatial context of conflict by focusing primarily on domestic conditions enhancing the 
occurrence of civil war. Other studies have ignored the temporal aspect of the diffusion 
of conflict. Fortunately, recent advances in spatial analyses and spatial econometrics 
offer opportunities for significant empirical and theoretical advancement in this respect 
(Raleigh, Witmer, and O‟Loughlin 2009, 4). 
  To fill this scientific niche in research on the occurrence of atrocities, in this study 
we examine whether the presence of refugees from neighboring countries influence the 
probability  that  a  country  experiences  human  right  abuses  against  the  civilian 
population. We do so by employing the spatial lag model that includes a temporal 
component, as is developed by Franzese and Hayes (2009). The spillover effects of 
atrocities are in our application weighted by several different spatial matrices: a border 
length matrix together with a matrix composed of the absolute number of refugees. 
The statistical analysis is focused on African continental countries during the period of 
1995-2010.  This  continent  seems  more  prone  to  conflict  and  violence  than  others 
(Coeffler and Hoeffler 2002). Any disruption in security is especially threatening to the 
African  populations,  who  are  already  living  at  the  margins  (Herbst  2004). 
Understanding the circumstances under which refugees can increase the likelihood of 
the occurrence of atrocities is then also crucial to help with creating better policies for 
managing relevant security concerns (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006, 339). 
This article proceeds as follow. First, we articulate the mechanisms through which 
refugees might contribute to the spread of atrocities and discuss previous research. The 
section that follows, describes the method and research design of this study. We then 
analyze the variation in atrocities with the spatio-temporal-lag model as described by 
Franzes and Hayes (2009). Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the results and 
their relevance.  
 
 
Refugees as a Domino Effect 
Although there is relatively little academic literature specifically on refugees and their 
influence on the spread of violence, there is now a growing body of work about the 5 
 
internationalization of conflict more broadly (e.g., De Silva and May 1991; Midlarsky 
1992; Brown 1996; Carment and James 1997; Lake and Rothchild 1998). This body of 
work has identified refugee flows as one of the factors that might contribute to the 
cross-border spread of conflict.
1 The idea that refugee flows across national boundaries 
and internal displacement have influence on the spread of conflict stands in contrast 
with previous research, which consider refugee flows as the unfortunate  consequences 
of violence and a humanitarian dilemma, rather than as part of the conflict  dynamic 
itself (Salehyan 2007, 127-128).  
  Weiner  (1992,  94)  was  among  the  first  to  emphasize  the  linkage  between 
international migration and security consequences. He, for example, emphasized that 
migration (economic migration and refugee flows) might cau se conflict in cases where 
migrants mobilize against their home country. When their home country retaliates, the 
conflict can even  escalate into a full-scale international war. Lake and Rotchild (1998, 
30) for example explain, “it can lead to recriminations between the two affected states, 
and in cases of „hot pursuit‟, direct border clashes that may spiral out of control.” The 
idea that refugees might sometimes turn into combatants, also called „refugee warriors‟, 
is not a new concept. Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo (1989) were among the first to 
argue  that  refugee  communities  frequently  become  prime  recruitment  areas  for 
combatant groups. Refugees have often grievance against the state from which they 
fled. These grievances in combination with the few prospects for education, livelihood 
opportunities, or freedom of movement, lead many young people in protracted refugee 
situations  have  few  opportunity  costs  for  joining  a  rebel  or  terrorist  movement 
(Salehyan  2007,  132;  Betts  and  Loescher  2011,  16).  In  recent  years  for  instance, 
Western governments have identified the refugee camps that host Palestinian refugees 
in the Middle East or Somali refugees in East Africa or Afghan refugees in Pakistan as a 
source  of  Islamic  radicalization  and  of  recruitment  for  terrorist  cells  (Betts  and 
Loescher 2011, 16). 
                                                 
1 Of course, there are many other possible factors that might increase the likelihood of the spreading 
of violence and conflict. Some of the factors, such as particular issues or actors, form a direct link 
between states. However, in some cases, a civil war in one country may also increase the risk of 
conflict in other states, even in the absence of these direct functional links.  
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  With the end of the Cold War and the decline of external support, the phenomenon 
of  refugee  warriors  has  even  proliferated  (Whitaker  2003,  214).  Increasingly, 
combatants  have  integrated  themselves  among  civilian  refugees  and  refugees  have 
become combatants. This does not only violate refugee-protection and human right 
principles, but can constitute further security concerns such as drug smuggling and 
trafficking in women and children (Loescher and Milner 2005, 153). In addition, it 
might cause illegal arms trafficking because the presence of refugees may put pressure 
at the border in customs, therefore reducing the ability of the receiving country to 
police and patrol its border and its customs, leading to an increase in the illegal arms 
smuggling into the host country (Narcisco 2011).  
  Most of the research on refugee warriors has focused on the effect of these refugees 
on  the  home  country.  However,  refugees  might  also  have  important  security 
consequence  for  the  host  country.  Scholars  on  the  spread  of  civil  conflict  have 
identified  a  series  of  spillover  or  external  effects  of  conflicts  (Salehyan  2009). 
Quantitative and qualitative research has, for example, shown that due to transnational 
ethnic ties, refugee influx can exacerbate previously existing ethnic antagonisms and 
change the balance of power in the host state by altering the state‟s ethnic composition 
(Whitaker  2003,  213;  Saideman  2001;  Woodwell  2004).  Especially,  through  a 
„demonstration effect‟, conflict in one country can lead actors in other states to update 
their beliefs about the efficiency and desirability of challenging their won governments 
(Beissinger  2002,  Kuran  1998).  This  process  of  diffusion  (as  termed  by  Lake  and 
Rothchild 1998) can lead to possible chain reactions in which for example one ethnic 
conflict causes refugees, who de-stabilize their host state by causing more war, causing 
more refugees and so on (Fearon 1998, 112). This concern about ethnic balance was 
made explicit in Macedonia‟s reluctance to accept Kosovar Albanian refugees in March 
1999.  Macedonian  officials  then  briefly  closed  the  borders  with  Kosovo,  after  the 
sudden arrival of more than 2 million ethnic Albanian refugees, which threatened the 
government‟s fragile coalition between the Macedonian (two-third of the population) 
and the Albanian (one fourth of the population) (Alter and Power 1999).  
  Other  statistical  analyses  have  emphasized  a  series  of  more  indirect  effects  of 
refugees on the possible likelihood of conflict. Murdoch and Sandler (2002), although 
not explicating focusing on the effect of refugees, have shown that a civil war reduces 7 
 
economic growth and welfare in neighboring states. There is good reason to believe 
that  migration  contributes,  at  least  in  part,  to  these  effects  (Salehyan  2007,  133). 
Loescher  and  Milner  (2005,  161)  for  example,  state  that  competition  over  scarce 
resources, especially in the context of declining donor engagement in protracted refugee 
situations, can also be a source of conflict between refugees and the local population. 
Besides the effect of refugees on the level of economic growth and the occurrence of 
civil  war,  there  are  also  some  scholars  mentioning  the  importance  of  the  linkage 
between refugees and infectious diseases (e.g. Collier et al. 2003).  
 
 
Modeling Spatial Effects and the Influence of Refugees 
Besides many qualitative studies on refugees as a negative externality, such as Loescher 
and Milner (2005) and Whitaker (2003), quantitative empirical studies primarily focused 
on  unit-level  (individual,  domestic)  factors,  ignoring  contextual  effects  and 
interdependence  processes.  Other  studies  have  adopted  the  so-called  context-
conditional approach, in which the possible spatial dependence is modeled in such a 
way that the exogenous-external conditions affect units‟ outcomes but unit‟s outcomes 
do not directly affect other units‟ outcomes (Franzese and Hayes 2008, 752). A good 
example of such a contextual-conditional approach is the study conducted by Salehyan 
and Gleditsch (2006). In this study, the authors model the number of refugees that a 
state  receives  from  neighboring  states  as  an  independent  variable  in  their  analysis. 
Consequently, the occurrence of conflict depends among others on the refugee context 
but this context remains exogenously external to the dependent variable. However, in 
truly interdependent processes, an outcome in some units directly affects other units‟ 
outcomes, implying some feedback. Ignoring (in the case of primarily focusing on unit-
level explanations) or inadequately modeling of interdependence processes (in the case 
of  modeling  the  context  exogenously  external  to  units)  leads  to  the  misestimation 
(usually overestimation) the strength of interdependence at the expense of unit-level 
factors  (Franzese  and  Hayes  2008,  752).  At  the  same  time,  simply  controlling  for 
spatial-lag  processes,  as  is  done  by  Salehyan  and  Gleditsch  (2006)  introduces 
simultaneity  biases,  often  exaggerating  interdependence  effects  and  understating 8 
 
domestic/unit-level,  exogenous-external,  and  context-conditional  impacts  (Franzese 
and Hayes 2009, 244). 
  Those empirical studies that have tried to capture this spatial and possible temporal 
inter-dependence and to solve the so-called Galton‟s problem generally fall into two 
general approaches: a data-driven and a theory-driven approach (Franzese and Hays 
2007). The first approach treats spatial and temporal dependences as a data problem 
and seeks to correct rather than estimate it. Models that fall into this category are, for 
example, semi-naïve models (such as panel-corrected standard errors) or spatial-error 
models in which spatial dependence is in generally treated as a stochastic component 
attributable to unmeasured covariates only. The weakness of these kinds of models is 
that inter-dependence among units of analysis can only have an effect through inter-
related  error  terms.  For  example,  if  the  amount  of  atrocities  in  country  i  changes 
because  of  a  parameter  that  is  not  modeled,  it  affects  the  amount  of  atrocities  in 
country j. However, when it changes because of a modeled parameter, this would have 
no impact on neighboring countries.  
  Theoretically-driven spatial models, in contrast, such as the spatial lag regression 
model, aim at explicitly modeling and estimating spatial and/or temporal effects. It 
differs from the spatial error model in that both the error terms and the covariates in 
nearby units impact the current unit (Beck, Gleditsch and Beardsley 2006, 30). In this 
model, the spatial autocorrelation is accounted for by the disturbance in the lagged 
dependent  variable  weighted  by  the  connectivity  matrix.  As  Beck,  Gleditsch  and 
Beardsley  (2006)  conclude,  this  makes  the  lagged  dependent  variable  model  more 
preferable for estimating social theories.  
  Franzese and Hayes (2009) developed a specific type of a spatially lagged model (a 
refined version of the spatial maximum likelihood model), a spatio-temporal lag model 
with  multiple  spatial  weights  matrices,  which  helps  to  reduce  bias  by  allowing  to 
explicitly model all the sources of the interdependence. This model is able to jointly 
estimate unit-level effects (e.g. country-specific variables), temporal effects, as well as 
the effect of the interdependence among units. This model can be written in matrix 
notation as follow: 
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Where  , the dependent variable is an NT   1 vector of cross sections stacked by 
period.     is  the  spatial  autoregressive  coefficient,  and     is  an  NT     NT  spatial 
weighting matrix (also called the higher order data). Consequently,    is the spatial lag, 
reflecting the spatial connectivity between each unit of observation.    is the yearly 
time-lagged  dependent  variable,  with     its  coefficient.  The  matrix     contains  NT 
observations on k independent variables, with   their k   1 vector of coefficients.    
is then also the nonspatial component (or the so-called lower order data) of the model 
formed by domestic unit-level factors of the host country j that determine the number 
of  perpetrated  atrocities.  Finally,     is  a  NT     1  vector  of  stochastic  components, 
assumed independent and identically distributed. 
 
 
Data Measurement and Operationalization 
To implement a spatio-temporal lag model with multiple spatial weights matrices, it is 
necessary  not  only  to  define  the  lower  order  data,  i.e.  the  independent  variables 
included in our analyses, but also and perhaps even more important the higher order 
data in the form of different weighting matrices. Carefully and accurately specifying  , 
the  spatial weighting matrix, is  then  also crucial  for modeling correctly  patterns of 
relative interconnectivity. In this application, we model the interdependence with two 
different weighting matrices:    and     
  The  first  weighting  matrix,    ,  compromises  a  standard  matrix,  in  which  the 
amount of kilometers of border length between countries is coded. The data on the 
exact border length between countries is coming from the CIA World Factbook and 
was coded manually. This spatial weighting matrix is based on the assumption that the 
likelihood of refugees fleeing into a host country is partly determined by the length of 
border with the country of origin. Those countries that do not share a border receive a 
value of 0. The maximum amount of border length shared by African countries is more 
than 10.000 kilometers, this is solely due to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. See 
Table I for more descriptive statistics on this weighting matrix. Note, that although 
theoretically the border length weighting matrix is a  N   N matrix (assuming that 10 
 
border lengths do not change over time), practically for the implication of the spatio-
temperol lag model, this matrix is transformed into a NT   NT matrix.
2 
  The second spatial weighting  NT   NT matrix used in the analyses,   , weights 
the amount of refugees coming from country i in period t and being host by country j 
in that same period, relatively to the total amount of refugees from that year. The 
information  on  the  number  of  refugees  comes  from  the  United  Nation  High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Statistical Online Population Database. This 
online database provides data and trends on the “Population of concern to UNHCR” 
in  more  than  150  countries,  among  others  the  amount  of  refugees.  Detailed 
information on country of asylum and origin is listed, for some population categories 
going back to 1951, the year UNHCR was created. The annual data contains dyadic 
records of refugee stocks, organized by the origin and asylum countries. For example, 
the dataset contains information on the more than 2.2 million people that fled Rwanda 
to neighboring countries in 1994. See Table I for more descriptive statistics on the 
refugee weighting matrix. 
  Note  that  all  the  weighting  matrices  are  row-standardized  before  used  in  the 
analysis. This does not change the relative dependence among neighboring countries, 
but it does change the total impact of neighboring countries across observations.  
 
Table I. Descriptive statistics of the higher order data 
Weighting Matrices  Obs.  Min  Max  Mean  Std. Dev. 
           
  ; N   N border length matrix  2916  0  10730  3017  2305 
  ; NT   NT refugee matrix  52488  0  2256984  58704  156071 
           
 
Our lower order data consist of the regular variables necessary to build our models, i.e. 
our dependent and independent variables (see Table II for the descriptive statistics). 
Data on the dependent variable, the number of atrocities against the civilian population, 
comes from the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) worldwide atrocities dataset. 
                                                 
2 A good example, in which the border length changes, is in the case of South Sudan. However, 
for the sake of simplicity, we have treated this new country as being part of Sudan.  11 
 
This event-dataset describes, in quantitative terms, the deliberate killing and harming of 
individuals who may be combatants in a different context, but who at the time they 
were killed or harmed were unarmed and unable to defend themselves, in the context 
of a wider political conflict. The current version covers January 1995 to April 2011 and 
includes about 6500 events. For our dependent variable, we collapsed this dataset on 
the country-year level, resulting in 779 observations across 54 African countries. In 
cases where there was a so-called „campaign‟, i.e. a set of reportedly related atrocities 
perpetrated by members of a single organization or by multiple organizations reportedly 
acting in concert, over a distinct period of time within a single country, the number of 
events were averaged over the distinctive years. The number of atrocities resulting in 
the death of civilians in the host country forms our main dependent variable. However, 
some of our models are focused on injured civilians in host countries or on the total 
number of civilian victimized (death and injured together). 
  Taking  refugees  into  account  may  explain  part  of  the  diffusion  of  atrocities. 
However, other state and spatial attributes might also have an effect. To avoid bias in 
the estimated coefficients, we included several variables that are identified in the general 
literature  on  atrocities,  for  having  an  effect.  Firstly,  the  strategic  literature  on  the 
occurrence of one-sided violence argues that atrocities against the civilian population 
especially occur when warring parties are desperate to win (Downes 2006). Targeting 
the noncombatant population allows these warring parties to continue fighting, reduce 
casualties, and possibly win  the war by coercing the  adversary to quit. One  of the 
indicators for this “desperation idea” is battlefield losses (see for example Hultman 
2007).  The  more  members  of  warring  parties  are  killed,  the  higher  their  level  of 
desperation and the more likely they will target the civilian population. Battlefield losses 
are conceptualized in the amount of battle-deaths per country-year. In our analyses we 
included the logged number of best estimated amount of battle-deaths per country-year 
of the host country as well as that of the neighboring countries. These two measures 
were constructed on the basis of the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, version 5 of 
2011. 
  Secondly,  also  related  to  the  strategic  idea  on  the  occurrence  of  atrocities,  we 
include the number of active rebel groups involved in the conflict per country-year. 
This  number  might  complicate  the  bargaining  process:  when  several  groups  are 12 
 
competing with each other or with the government, it can create a process of intra-
group competition for the support of the civilian population. This competition might 
lead  to  violence  against the  noncombatant  population  if  they  are considered  to  be 
(potential) supporters for opponents. Eliminating these potential supports, also called 
the „fifth column‟, reduces not only the strength of opponents, but also decreases the 
likelihood that civilians revolt in an army‟s rear area, as well as potential revolts that 
might occur later on (Downes 2006). We coded the number of rebel groups per conflict 
per country-year on the basis of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4, 
2011. Some countries had no active rebel groups, while others had a maximum of 3 
groups present. In addition, we used this dataset to construct a variable measuring the 
number of rebel groups in neighboring countries. See Table II for some descriptive 
statistics on these variables. 
  Although, atrocities against the civilian population does not necessarily have to take 
place in the context of an armed conflict, Eck and Hultman (2007, 237) found that less 
than 1% of the total civilian fatalities take place in conflict divided countries. To include 
these conflict dynamics on the occurrence of violence against civilians, we used the 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (version 4) to construct a variable counting the 
number of intrastate wars in neighboring countries. This variable ranges from 0 to 7, 
with a mean of 1.023. See Table II for more descriptive statistics. 
  We also include a variable measuring the total country population (logged). It is 
hypothesized that the larger the population size of a specific country, the more likely a 
conflict  occurs,  resulting  in  refugee  flows.  Furthermore,  as  a  „gravity  model‟  of 
international migration would suggest, refugees may be especially likely to migrate to 
larger countries (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006, 354). The data on the population size 
per country-year comes from the World Development Indicators (WDI) collected by 
the World Bank. This dataset is also used for the construction of the variable capturing 
the  natural  log of the gross domestic  product  (GDP) per capita.  We  included this 
particular indicator because  we  expect that refugee  flows are more  likely  to spread 
violence in weak host states. The governments of such states, lack the capacity either 
to resettle  the  refugees or to force them to abandon their armed  struggle to avoid 
retaliation  by  their state of origin (Atzili 2006, 152). Consequently, we expect fewer 
atrocities taking place in host countries with a relative high GDP per capita. In addition, 13 
 
conflict research has shown that civil conflicts are less likely to occur in wealthier states 
(see for example, Fearon and Laitin 2003). Descriptive statistics on both macro-level 
indicators can also be found in Table II. 
  Furthermore, we include in our analyses a variable capturing the importance of 
ethnicity. In situations where the refugee-generating conflict has ethnic dimensions, a 
high level of polarizations of ethnic identities in the host country may contribute to 
violence and instability. To capture this possible mechanism we include the standard 
variable measuring the amount of ethnic fractionalization of the host country. For this, 
we used Alesina‟s et al. (2003) measurement for ethnic fractionalization that ranges 
between 0 (non-ethnical fractionalized country) and 1 (highly fractionalized country). 
  Lastly,  we  control  for  regime  type.  Scholars  who  evoked  democracy  as  an 
explanation of human right abuses, however, disagree over the effect that it has, and 
this dispute  reflects  the  norms versus institutions divide in  the  broader democratic 
peace literature (Downes 2006, 159). According to some scholars, democracies – which 
adhere to liberal norms that proscribe killing innocent civilians, are less likely to target 
civilians than non-democracies which are not so constrained. Studies of democratic 
institutions,  however, imply  just the  opposite:  democracies could be more  likely to 
target  noncombatants  because  the  vulnerability  of  leaders  to  public  opinion  makes 
them wary of incurring heavy costs in the battlefield for fear of losing support home. 
This fear could compel democratic elites to target noncombatants to avoid costs or to 
win the war quickly (e.g., Reiter and Stam 2002; Downes 2006, 153-154). In addition, a 
country whose political climate is characterized by collapses or deteriorating state that 
lacks popular legitimacy may be more vulnerable to conflict in the event of a refugee 
influx.  To  control  for  the  effect  of  regime  type,  we  used  the  Polity  4  data,  which 
contains an institutionalized democracy scale ranging from -10 for the least democratic 
political system to value of 10 for democratic polities. In the analyses, we include a term 
for a country‟s Polity score as well as its square to control for the inverted U-curve 
hypothesis, i.e. the idea that the risk of conflict and violence is the highest in states that 
are not fully democratic but also not quite autocratic (see for instance, Hegre et al. 
2001). See Table II for the descriptive statistics of these lower order data. 
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Variable  Obs.  Min  Max  Mean  Std. Dev. 
No. killed host country  972  0  107831  358.45  4780.84 
No. killed neighbouring countries   972  0  120098  2640.68  14369.72 
No. injured host country  972  0  24589  88.24  851.37 
No. injured neighbouring countries  972  0  24745  385.01  1512.45 
No. total victimized host country  972  0  107874  445.69  4881.49 
No. total victimized neighbouring countries 
  972  0  120376  3025.68  14472.41 
Polity  867  -9  10  0.54  5.35 
Polity squared  867  0  100  28.89  25.77 
No. rebel groups  918  0  3  0.32  0.70 
No. rebel groups in neighbouring countries  972  0  13  1.61  2.13 
No. civil wars in neighbouring countries  972  0  7  1.02  1.25 
GDP per capita (log)  874  14.39  23.02  21.62  1.06 
Population size (log)  901  11.23  22.72  15.70  1.65 
No. battle deaths host country  972  0  50000  246.47  2274.62 
No. battle deaths neighbouring countries (log)  972  0  53400  1326.60  4514.27 
Ethnical fractionalisation  884  0  0.93  0.63  0.25 
 
 
Analyses and Preliminary Results 
Before  turning  to  the  preliminary  analyses  and  results,  it  is  worth  mentioning  that 
estimation of the spatio-temporal lag model with multiple spatial weights matrices is 
computationally  intense,  especially  in  combination  with  pooled  time-series  data 
(repeated observations on fixed units).
3 This task is further complicated by the space, 
memory and speed limitations of the available statistical software. The models show 
below should then also be considered as first attempts to apply this specific kind of 
spatial analyses to the study of refugees and atrocities. In all calculated models, we have 
used two weighting matrices: the N   N matrix,   , which captures the amount of 
kilometers of border length between countries (see Rho 2 in the tables below) and the 
                                                 
3 We used the Stat spreg command developed by MacMillan, Franzese and Hayes (2009). 15 
 
NT   NT weighting matrix,   , which captures the amount of refugees coming from 
one country going to another (see Rho 1 in the tables below). 
  Table III shows the first few computed spatial models. All three models are focused 
on examining the influence of those independent variables that are spatial determined 
on  the  level  of  atrocities  in  the  host  country.  The  difference  between  the  three 
presented  models  lies  in  the  dependent  variable.  In  the  first  model,  we  focus  on 
explaining the variation in the number of civilians killed in the host country, in the 
second model we have focused on the number of injured civilians, and the last model is 
focused on the total amount of civilians killed and harmed in the host country. Note 
that coefficients in the presented models cannot be directly interpreted. They represent 
the  (usually  unobservable)  pre-interdependence  impetuses  to  outcomes  from  each 
independent  variable  (Hayes  et  al.  2010,  15).  Their  effects  are  usually  interpreted 
through the effects of counterfactual shocks to some units of themselves or other units 
over time. Consequently, we focus in our analyses on the direction of the effect and 
whether it is statistical significant. 
 
Table III. Preliminary spatial analyses focused on the spatial dependent variables 



















No. injured neighbouring (log)    -0.0004 
(0.033) 
 
No. total neighbouring (log)      0.092** 
(0.036) 
























Rho 2: Border length matrix  -0.095*  0.029  -0.059 16 
 
(0.054)  (0.053)  (0.053) 






       
N  972  972  972 
Log-Likelihood  -2128  -1984  -2220 
AIC  4272  3984  4456 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at the .01 level; **Significant at the .05 level; * 
Significant at the .10 level. 
 
The first model in Table III has a dependent variable the number of killed civilians (log) 
in the host country. In order to explain the variation in this measure, we first examine 
those variables that are spatial distributed. One important variable that might explain 
this variation is the number of killed civilians in neighboring countries. This variable is 
positive and significant on the 0.01 level. In other words, when the number of civilians 
killed  in  neighboring  countries  increases,  the  amount  of  civilians  killed  in  the  host 
country also increase. This outcome confirms our expectations. Furthermore, we have 
included a variable measuring the number of battle deaths in neighboring countries. 
This  variable  has  a  negative  coefficient  and  is  statistical  significant.  The  negative 
coefficient  of  -0.063  indicates,  that  the  more  battle  related  deaths  in  neighboring 
countries, the fewer civilians are killed in the host country. One explanation of this 
puzzling result might be that the more battle related deaths in neighboring states, the 
more intense the conflict is. An intense conflict might result in fewer civilians daring to 
flee  the  area  to  a  safer  host  country.  Another  possible  explanation  might  be  that 
because large numbers of combatants are killed, fewer combatants with weapons are 
hiding among the refugee population. This in turn would then diminish the amount of 
atrocities  occurring  in  the  host  country.  Further  analyzes  should  examine  these 
possibilities. 
  Additionally, we controlled for the amount of rebel groups active in neighboring 
countries. We hypothesized that the more groups are present, the more they compete 
for civilian support, which might result in the killing of the so-called „fifth column‟. The 
number of rebel groups in neighboring countries has a positive and statistical significant 
influence on the number of killed civilians in the host country, which again confirms 
our expectation. Also included is a variable, measuring the number of civil wars in 
neighboring countries. This variable has a positive but not significant effect. We have 17 
 
also tested for the effect of the two spatial weighting matrices and for the temporal 
effect. Rho 1 and Rho 2 are the two spatial weighting matrices used in the analyses. 
Both spatial matrices are statistical significant, indicating that analyzing the amount of 
killed  civilians  in  a  host  countries  has  indeed  a  spatial  component.  The  positive 
coefficient  of  the  refugee  weighting  matrix  indicates  a  positive  interdependence 
between the amount of refugees and the number of civilians killed. This confirms our 
general  expectation  that  refugees  have  an  impact  on  the  spread  of  violence.  The 
coefficient of the second weighting matrix is negative, primarily due to the amount of 
zeros, i.e. many countries do not share a border with each other.  
In addition, the temporal lag is highly significant, meaning that the data has a clearly 
time trend.  
  In the third column of Table III, the dependent variable has changed. Instead of 
trying to explain the amount of civilians killed, atrocities is defined as the number of 
injured civilians in the host country. Like the previous model, the amount of rebel 
groups in neighbouring countries have a positive influence on the amount of injured 
civilians in the host country. However, all other spatial determined variables have lost 
significance. We presume that this is because of the lack of variance in the dependent 
variable. In addition, it might be the case that the number of injured civilians is only 
recorded whenever information on civilian killings is available. It is important, however, 
to note that even though the general significance level has declined, the refugee spatial 
weighting matrix (Rho 1) and the temporal lag is still significant.  
  The last model presented in Table III attempt to explain the variation in the total 
amount of killed and injured civilians in the host country. However, this model does 
not show any major difference with the previous two models. The number of total 
victimized civilians in neighbouring countries has a positive and significant influence on 
those  victimized  in  the  host  country.  Also  the  number  of  rebel  groups  active  in 
neighbouring countries has again a positive and significant effect on the total amount of 
victimized civilians in the host country. In addition, the refugee weighting matrix and 
the temporal lag is again of importance in explaining this variation. 
 
In Table IV, we have estimated several additional models, each explaining the variation 
in  the  number  of  killed  civilians  in  the  host  country.  We  focus  on  this  particular 18 
 
dependent variable because this measure of atrocities show not only the most amount 
of  variation  but  has  also  a  high  number  of  observations,  which  is  important  for 
calculation of the different spatial temporal lag models. 
 
Table IV. Preliminary spatial analyses on the role of refugees in the spread of civilian 
killings  















































Polity  0.002 
(0.015) 




Polity squared  -0.013*** 
(0.003) 




GDP per capita (log)  -0.015 
(0.069) 
  0.017 
(0.058) 
 
Population size (log)  0.556*** 
(0.052) 









Ethnic Fractionalization  -0.076 
(0.330) 
  0.030 
(0.288) 
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N  847  918  847  867 
Log-Likelihood  -1819  -1850  -1667  -1721 
AIC  3700  3769  3364  3463 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at the .01 level; **Significant at the .05 level; * 
Significant at the .10 level. 
 
In the fourth model of Table IV, the macro non-spatial model, the amount of civilian 
killings in the host country is explained with a batch of control variables that are solely 
focused on the influence of domestic factors. Consistent with earlier studies on the 
onset of conflict, we find an inverted-U relationship between the Polity score and the 
number of killed civilians in the host country. The positive coefficient estimate for the 
Polity and the negative coefficient for the squared term of Polity suggested that both 
democracies (positive values) and authoritarian governments (negative values on the 
Polity  scale)  are  less  likely  to  experience  atrocities  perpetrated  against  the  civilian 
population. We also found that the natural log of GDP per capita has no significant 
effect on the amount of the number of killed civilians. In other words, the GDP per 
capita does not seem to relate to the occurrence of atrocities in that same country. This 
finding opposes the general idea that countries with a higher GDP per capita are better 
able to manage the incoming refugees and consequently can diminish the amount of 
civilian killing perpetrated in their territory. Population size in is contrast to the GDP 
per  capita  significant,  indicating  that  the  larger  the  population  size  the  more  likely 
atrocities against the civilian population occurs. Ethnic fractionalization, on the other 
hand, does not seem to influence the amount of killed civilians in the host country at a 
significant  level.  The  direction  of  the  coefficient,  however,  indicate  that  the  more 
ethnical fractionalization, the fewer civilians are killed. This confirms the theoretical 
idea that having ethnical dominant group in the country decreases the likelihood of war 
and violence. Only one of the two spatial weighting matrices seems to have a profound 
impact on the level of atrocities in the host country, namely the one that takes into 
account the relative number of refugees. Also the temporal lag is highly significant, 
indicating that time is an important predictor for the level of atrocities. 
  The fifth model in the table is focused on testing the strategic logic of the killing of 
civilians.  This  strategic  logic  argues  that  the  killing  of  civilians  might  be  rational 
considering the strategic environment in which these act against humanity takes place. 20 
 
The first independent variable looks at the influence of the number of killed civilians in 
the  neighbouring  country.  The  coefficient  of  this  variable  is  positive  and  highly 
significant. Indicating the atrocities in neighbouring countries is related to atrocities in 
the  host  country.  Also  the  amount  of  rebel  groups  in  the  host  and  neighbouring 
countries have a positive and significant effect on the number of civilians killed in the 
host country. Like the other models, the number of battle deaths in the host country 
has a significant positive impact on the number of killed civilians. However, like in the 
previous analyses, we find that the number of battle death in neighbouring countries is 
negative related to the number of civilians killed in the host country. We purposefully 
excluded the variable measuring the number of civil wars in the host country from the 
strategic model, because the intra-state war measure is calculated on the basis of the 
battle-related deaths information. If there are battle-related deaths, then there is civil 
war, whether minor or major. Note that the two spatial weighting matrices have lost 
significant and that the AIC value has increased.  
  The last two models are summarizing the findings of the previous ones. The sixth 
model, the complete model, includes all variables from the previous models. The results 
suggest tht our findings are robust. Although some of the variables lose some of their 
power, because of a decrease in the degrees of freedom, the effect of most variables 
stay the same. The last model, that is calculated, includes all variables that are significant 
in the previous models. The significant level of the variables in the full model has 
increased.  However,  the  AIC  value  indicates  that  even  though  only  the  significant 
variables are included in the analyses the strategic model has a better fit.  
 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
This study is a first attempt to employ a spatial framework to explain the occurrence of 
atrocities. Instead of arguing that atrocities against the civilian population are primarily 
due  to  domestic  conditions,  such  as  the  presence  of  rebel  groups,  we  argue  that 
atrocities might also be the result of conditions in neighboring countries. This spatial 
view on atrocities stands in sharp contrast with the common view in political science, 
which treats countries and their local conditions somewhat like „atoms‟ floating in space 
(Agnew 1994; O‟Louglin and Raleigh 2007, 3).  21 
 
  We assume that refugees are one of the causal mechanisms connecting different 
countries and causing the spread of atrocities across borders. Refugees can not only 
transport weapons to the host country, but can spread radical ideologies, change the 
power balance between ethnicities and serve as an example for those people that want 
to  take  up  their  weapons.  Consequently,  understanding  the  role  of  refugees  in  the 
spread of atrocities is essential if we want to explain its occurrence and variation. Only 
then the policy community can develop and implement effective measures protecting 
those that need to be protected. 
  In  our  examination  of  the  role  of  refugees  in  the  spread  of  violence,  we  have 
employed a rather new spatial method, the spatio-temperol lag model. In this model, a 
temporal lag (year) is included together with a spatial element. This spatial part of the 
model is defined in our application by two separate weighting matrices: one constituting 
the amount of refugees fleeing from the country of residence to a host country per year 
and  another  who  takes  into  account  the  border  length  between  countries. 
Consequently,  in  contrast  to  other  studies,  we  have  not  modeled  the  amount  of 
refugees as a separate independent variable. Rather, we consider refugees as a factor 
influencing the intensity of the spread of atrocities. 
  The different calculated models show that it is important to include spatial defined 
variables in order to explain the variation in civilian killings. The analyzes show that 
refugees have a significant impact on the amount of perpetrated atrocities. Given the 
number of observations and degrees of freedom, the strategic model is the best in 
explaining  the  variation.  The  amount  of  civilians  killed  in  neighboring  states,  the 
amount  of  rebel  groups  within  the  host  state  and  neighboring  countries,  and  the 
amount of battle deaths in the host country have all a highly significant influence. Other 
variables  like  ethnic  fractionalization  and  the  number  of  civil  wars  in  neighboring 
countries are of less importance.    
  It  is  important  to  note  that  some  of  the  hypothesized  causal  linkages  are  less 
significant than expected. This is primarily due to two reasons. First, the term „refugee‟ 
means  different  things  in  different  contexts  (Betts  and  Loescher  2011).  In  the 
vernacular, the term „refugee‟ is often very broad. It is popularity seen by the media and 
the  public as incorporating  people fleeing a range  of causes including authoritarian 
regimes;  conflict;  human  rights  violations;  large-scale  development  projects; 22 
 
environmental  disasters;  resulting  from  hurricanes,  tsunamis,  and  climate  change. 
However, under international law, a refugee is a person who „owing to a well-founded 
fear of prosecution… is outside of his or her country of nationality‟. In that sense 
refugees are defined by a number of aspects – notably being outside the country of 
origin and fleeing prosecution. This definition is also employed by the UNHCR and 
forms the basis of their data on refugee flows. 
   Secondly, using the spatio-temporal lag model requires precise and consistent data. 
However,  this  data  is  not  always  available  in  such  terms.  For  example,  in  this 
application we have ran models taking into account 54 African countries from 1995 to 
2010. However, our dependent variable does not have information on each possible 
country for each possible year. These „empty-cells‟ might cause problems when running 
the models since the number of observations decreases significantly. It is then also of 
crucial importance for the development of new spatial model and for their application 
in conflicts studies that data is collected in a more consistent way taking into account 
the spatial settings. For example, this study has focused on African countries due to a 
lack of refugee data on lower levels of analysis. However, it might be interesting to 
disaggregate our research to the regional level. In addition, it can also be fruitful to 
extend the current analyses to a Bayesian approach that can handle smaller numbers of 
observation. However, to our knowledge this has so far not been modeled and applied 
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